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LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS.' By William K
Muir, Jr. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
1982. Pp. xiv, 219. $19.

One might expect a book about a state legislature to be a muckraking expose of one of America's worst political institutions. The
study of state legislatures has, after all, traditionally been a course on
political bosses, backroom dealings, and the financial influence of
lobbyists. 1 Professor William Muir's2 portrayal of the California
legislature from 1975 through 19783 provides a welcome relief from
this negative stereotype. Professor Muir analogizes the legislature to
a "school" where most members acquire what James Madison called
the three competencies of democratic leadership: patriotism, love of
justice, and wisdom (pp. 3-4).4 From 1975 to 1978, Muir contends,
I. See, e.g., w. MORRIS, NORTH TOWARD HOME 204-09 (1967).
2. William K. Muir, Jr. is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND
ATTITUDE CHANGE (1967) and POLICE: STREET-CORNER POLITICIANS (1977).
3. Professor Muir served on two staff committees, business and welfare, during the 1975-76
Session of the California legislature. In 1977-78, he conducted interviews with twenty-eight
legislators. The theme of the questions was, "As a legislator, how do you make the legislature
intelligible to laymen?"
4. By patriotism, Madison meant an expanded sympathy for all of one's constituents; by
love ofjustice, he implied a concern for fair play and adherence to procedures; and by wisdom,
he referred to the kind of enlightened statecraft necessary to achieve enduring improvements
in the general welfare. Pp. 3-4; see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51, 53 & 63 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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the California legislature was unusually successful in providing its
"students" with an education.
Professor Muir identifies three ingredients that contributed to the
quality of education during the 1975-76 "golden age" (p. 9) of the
California legislature. The first ingredient was the dispersion of
power. Two factors were mainly responsible for this decentralization. The first was the "author'' system of shepherding bills through
the legislative process. The author system allowed each legislator to
maintain control of every bill he or she sponsored (p. 58). This system contrasts with that of the United States Congress, in which a
committee takes control of a bill and marks it up. Control by committee fosters centralized decisionmaking, because when committees
make changes without the author's concurrence, lobbyists tend to
deal only with committee chairs (p. 58).5 The second decentralizing
factor was the requirement of a roll call for every vote in committee.
This requirement prevented committee chairs from arrogating excessive power to themselves by ignoring the actual votes of committee
members and making unilateral decisions.
This dispersal power created a need for the dissemination of information to all members of the legislature. California's effective
"system of support," the mechanism by which information was distributed abundantly and on a nonpartisan basis, was the second ingredient contributing to the high quality of education.6 Information
flowed to legislators from nonpartisan staff and from lobbyists. The
nonpartisan support staff operated from within three independent
organizations: the Committees themselves; the Office of Legislative
Analysis; and a research office that provided a "Third Reading
Analysis." Committee staffs conducted the basic research pertaining
to the bills in their respective committees. The Office of Legislative
Analysis acted as the legislature's agent in overseeing the executive
branch. This Office was also responsible for analyzing the Governor's proposed annual budget. The research office provided a
"Third Reading Analysis," which gave each legislator a short
description and discussion of every bill that reached the floor of the
legislature. The legislators thus had access to a report on a bill prepared independently of the staff of the committee that had sent the
bill to the floor. Lobbyists also were a valuable source of information. With their financial clout apparently curtailed by strict disclo5. The Author system - under which every bill would be entitled to a hearing - would
not be feasible in the United States House of Representatives, which has 435 members. In
contrast, the California State Assembly has only 80 members, and the State Senate has 40
Senators.
6. Although an efficient flow of high quality information may be necessary for the effective
functioning of any legislature, one must view Muir's praise for the California system with a
degree of caution. Muir himself was one of those engaged in the collection and dissemination
of information. His observations while so employed form the basis for his book.
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sure requirements of campaign and personal contributions to
legislators, lobbyists could wield influence only by providing accurate information.
The third and final ingredient that contributed to the success of
the California legislature was that it required its members to acquire
specialized knowledge. Muir argues that the structure of California's system, rather than the desire for reelection, provided the incentive for legislators to obtain specialized knowledge. Although the
time that the legislators spent acquiring knowledge in the state capital reduced the time available for essential reelection activities in
their home districts, two features of California's system provided
counter-incentives that favored the acquisition of knowledge. The
'first was the author system, which placed primary responsibility for a
bill in the hands of its author. Only an author expert in the subject
matter of his bill could defend it successfully. The second feature
was the "Buddy System Rule." This "rule" required members to
vote against a bill only on its merits and not for other reasons such as
vote swapping or inertia. Thus, the burden of explaining a vote fell
on the naysayers. To justify a negative vote, a legislator had to state
his understanding of the bill and his reasons for voting no. Such a
justification obviously required an understanding of the bill.
These incentives produced two benefits. First, they made the legislature a place where high-quality information was assimilated and
disseminated. This information provided the foundation for innovative and successful policymaking. Second, the development of specialization facilitated effective oversight of the state bureaucracy.
Having set forth the three ingredients that made the California
State Legislature particularly productive, Muir turns his attention to
"the universal rules, the general principles about mankind and society, that governed the legislative systems so as to produce a superior
education in political competency'' (p. 101). Muir does not view
competition between the two major parties as the primary process
that made the legislature tick. The power of political parties and of
patronage was relatively insignificant in the California legislature.
Primary elections, instead of party leaders, determined a party's
nominee for every elective office. Few jobs were filled by virtue of
partronage, since civil service was the only route to all but the highest level political appointments (p. 117). Legislators from both parties obtained information from nonpartisan support staffs (p. 113).7
7. Although the presence of a nonpartisan support staff assures all legislators of access to
information, the political parties are not irrelevant sources of knowledge. Since legislators in
the same party often act as if they were teammates, each party develops its own specialists
within the parameters of its philosophical viewpoints. P. 134. Thus, the presence of a Democratic specialist in one area does not prevent a young Republican member from developing a
similar expertise. Additionally, the threat of resourceful partisan competition keeps the non•
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In addition, the speaker could select as committee chairs legislators
who were not members of the majority party (p. 150).
Muir argues that the legislature operates by the principle of reciprocity rather than inter-party competition. By "reciprocity," Muir
means mutually-beneficial exchanges between two persons, which
leave both persons better off as a result. Thus, reciprocity is a means
by which Person A can influence Person B to do something of value
for A that B would not otherwise do (p. 107). Reciprocity, unlike
coercion and manipulation, can operate on a voluntary basis because
both sides benefit from the exchange (p. 107).
Of course, for a system of reciprocity to work, individuals must
have something of value to exchange with others. In the case of the
California legislature, Muir suggests, that "something" was knowledge, the information that members had obtained as a result of specializing. Muir's description of the exchange of knowledge among
legislators reminds the reader of the economist's classical market:
here, one member bartered his knowledge about one problem in exchange for another member's knowledge about something else.
Knowledge was both the currency of the legislature and the commodity that it traded. 8 Members specialized so that they could acquire something that others both lacked and valued. "Monopolies"
of knowledge in certain areas did not last, because the barriers to the
acquisition of knowledge were low and alternative sources of information were readily available (p. 129). In short, the legislative system Muir describes had all of the trappings of an efficiently
operating barter economy.
After showcasing the effectiveness of the California legislature
and explaining the principles on which it ran, Muir evaluates a
number of "reforms" advanced by various groups to improve the
functioning of state legislatures (pp. 192-98). His reactions to these
proposals and to some of his own proposals are the most provocative
part of the book. Muir rejects increasing party discipline, limiting
legislators' contacts with lobbyists, making legislative electoral districts more competitive, and more frequent elections as misguided.
In the end, Muir stands firm in his support for a system similar to the
one in which he participated during his stay in California.
Although Muir offers some provocative ideas on which reforms
would work and which would not, the reader is left with some nagpartisan support system energetic, balanced in its analyses, and as fair as humanly possible. P.
135.
8. Although knowledge is necessary for legislative reciprocity, the legislators' will to learn
goes beyond the desire of each individual to influence another. Each California legislator is,
by ambition and circumstance, a full-time politician. Job security is not among the many
benefits of political life. Thus, the legislator must internalize the benefits of the legislative
experience in order to carry his acquired knowledge on to the next stage of his public career.
P. 116.
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ging doubts. First, one suspects that Muir's enthusiasm at having
been a staff member for two committees during the "golden years"
of the California legislature may have biased his vision. Muir admits
that by 1980, the state legislature seemed "shaky and fragile" (p. 11).
Additionally, he notes that legislatures seem to run in cycles, from
high points of effective operation to low points, from abuses to reform. These admissions lead one to wonder whether the system is
the solution or whether forces external to the system propel the cycles. Second, Muir glosses over the question of the extent to which
legislators are beholden to the groups with the most money. He
seems to assume that disclosure requirements sufficiently limit the
financial influence of lobbyists. Many would no doubt challenge this
assumption.
.
Despite these :flaws, Professor Muir has offered a ray of hope for
effective state government. Legislature is an excellent book for the
student of government and for those interested in legislative reform.
Muir's study also has a broader appeal. Legislature is a public monument to the notion that good government is possible, even in the
state legislature. The education of the public is critical if we are to
be governed by the educated. The key to the success of the "golden
age" of the California legislature was that it educated its members,
tomorrow's leaders. A study of the conditions under which an institution fosters knowledge of effective government is a study of the
circumstances under which democracy will remain a viable political
system. Herein lies the value of Legislature.

